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The professional and ethical dilemmas of the two-child limit for Child Tax Credit and Universal 
Credit 
Abstract 
Child Tax Credit and Universal Credit provide means-tested support for low-income families. The 
government have introduced a two-child limit for these benefits meaning that the child element of 
Child Tax Credit and Universal Credit will no longer be awarded for third or subsequent children born 
after 06 April 2017. The government argue that the benefit system should provide a fair deal for the 
tax payer and that families claiming benefits should face the same financial choices as those in work. 
However, it has been argued that there is an inherent moral injustice in linking benefit entitlement 
to the size of the family and that there will be an increase in child poverty.  
Firstly this paper will discuss the ethics of limiting state financial support on the basis of family size 
with reference to how far social justice can be achieved in a ‘needs based’ benefits system. 
Secondly, there will be an analysis of the most controversial element of this policy – the so called 
‘rape clause’ where an exception is applied if a claimant can demonstrate that their third or 
subsequent child is born as a result of non-consensual sexual intercourse. Finally the paper will 
identify potential implications for anti-oppressive practice. 
The ethics of moving away from a ‘needs-based’ benefits system  
The two-child limit has been described as ‘pernicious’ in that it creates a system where some 
children are seen as more deserving recipients of welfare provision than others (Child Poverty Action 
Group, 2016). Linking the levels of social security benefits to family size raises fundamental 
questions about the welfare ‘safety net’. The two-child policy introduces an eligibility criteria where 
financial support is not linked to the needs of individual children and instead is based on a judgment 
about the extent to which the state is prepared to support low income families.   
The move away from a system based on individual need is underpinned by another dominant 
ideology: the benefit system will reward those who are perceived to be doing the ‘right thing’ and 
penalise those who behave in the opposite manner. Clearly in relation to the two-child policy the 
perceived correct behaviour is to limit the number of children born into a family.  CPAG (2016) argue 
that this is a flawed philosophy as it is impossible for any of us to predict our future circumstances. 
For example, unemployment, separation, bereavement or failed contraception could lead to a 
change in family composition and a possible need to claim means-tested benefits. These scenarios 
severely undermine the simplistic, binary notion of us making ‘appropriate’ or ‘inappropriate’ 
choices.  Similarly, Hills (2017) has emphasised that discourse around welfare benefits is undermined 
by the ‘myth’ that benefit claimants are a static, homogenised group when the reality is that across 
time our circumstances change and at certain points in life we are all recipients of welfare support.  
A benefit system based on family size is not without precedent. In 2016 seventeen US states 
administered some form of ‘welfare family cap’ (University of California, 2016).  In twelve of these 
states eligibility for cash grants is denied to children born into a family already in receipt of 
government benefits. Interestingly the maximum family grant (MFG) in California was abolished in 
June 2016 on the basis that it pushes the most vulnerable families into higher levels of poverty and 
had not altered the reproductive behaviour of claimants. In the UK there is little evidence that other 
areas of the government’s welfare reform programme have produced the behavioural changes 
sought. For example, significant numbers of tenants affected by the ‘bedroom tax’ have not moved 
to alternative properties and relatively small numbers of claimants subject to the benefit cap have 
moved into work (DWP, 2015, IFS 2014). 
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An analysis of the ethics of the two-child limit should acknowledge the government’s rationale for 
introducing this benefit change.  Since 2010 successive governments have pursued a welfare reform 
agenda based on the belief that the welfare system is too complex and lacks incentives to encourage 
people on benefits to move into work. The government maintain that the reshaped system is based 
on fairness and affordability. Since 2010 both David Cameron and his successor as Prime Minister 
Theresa May have been keen to emphasise that a fair benefits system is based on the principles of 
social justice. Crossley (2017, p31) states that the focus of the ‘compassionate conservatism’ version 
of social justice is on the individual and families, with ‘poverty presented as an effect of personal 
failings as opposed to an inadequate income and its effects’. This interpretation of social justice does 
not adequately recognise the way that poverty and inequality are perpetuated by systems and 
structures (Rawls 1999) or the impact that oppression and discrimination has on marginalised 
individuals (Lister, 2007). It is arguably also at odds with the Social Mobility Commission view that 
positive social change requires a fundamental reworking of the education system, housing market, 
local economies and the labour market (Social Mobility Commission 2016). 
The interpretation of social justice that underpins the introduction of the two-child limit very much 
centres on the ‘choices’ which families make about their lives: ‘Benefit entitlement adjusts 
automatically to family size, whilst families supporting themselves solely through work do not see 
their incomes rise in the same way when they have more children.’ (HM Government 2016,p5).  
Dorling (2010) has argued that in countries such as the UK where there are high levels of income 
inequality statements such as the above and policies such as the 2-child limit are more prevalent as 
the population as a whole is less compassionate. This fits with the notion of ‘othering’ (Patrick 2016) 
in which people experiencing poverty related problems can themselves establish a hierarchy of who is 
more or less deserving of state support.  
Exceptions to the two-child limit policy and the ethics of the ‘rape clause’ 
In January 2017 the government published details of the exceptions to the 2-child limit policy (DWP 
2017a). Claimants will be exempt from this policy in the following three circumstances: 
• Children likely to have been born as a result of rape 
• Children living long-term with family and friends 
• Children born in a multiple birth 
For the first two exceptions listed above a third-party evidence system has been introduced. This 
requires professionals such as social workers, GPs, midwives and health visitors to verify that a 
claimants’ circumstances meet one of the exceptions. Children may be living with family or friends 
on an informal basis and for the exception to apply in these circumstances a professional will be 
required to confirm that the child being cared for would otherwise have been cared for by a local 
authority. Similarly evidence will need to be provided to the benefit authorities if a more formal 
arrangement is in place (e.g. adoption of guardianship order). There are certainly capacity issues for 
professionals who will have these new responsibilities placed on them. We may also see some 
changes in the dynamics of the service user-professional relationship which could create ethical 
concerns where, for example, a social worker effectively becomes a ‘gate-keeper’ for a client to 
access benefits for their children. 
Without question the most significant ethical issues (both philosophical and practical) of the entire 
two-child limit policy relate to the ‘rape-clause’. The principles behind the ‘rape clause’ have been 
strongly criticised by a wide range of organisations (for example, Engender, Child Poverty Action 
Group, Citizens Advice Scotland). Engender (2017, p.3) state that ‘This clause will re-traumatise 
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individual women who have survived rape by forcing them to disclose sexual violence at a time and 
context not of their own choosing, on pain of deeper impoverishment.’ The benefit system is 
underpinned by a ‘burden of proof’ philosophy that rests with the claimant and these concerns 
about the nature and timing of disclosure are real and compelling. If a third or subsequent child is 
born as a result of non-consensual conception at a time when the claimant was in an abusive 
relationship and subject to ‘control or coercion’ an exception which also apply. However, the 
claimant will need to confirm that she is no longer living with the alleged perpetrator. The 
government argue that this is necessary to ensure that perpetrators do not benefit financially from 
the exception. However, it has been argued that this fails to recognise the difficulty that victims can 
have in leaving an abusive partner (Machin, 2017). 
Department for Work and Pensions guidance (DWP 2017b) states that in addition to social workers 
and health professionals, evidence will be accepted through the completion of an approved form by 
a specialist worker from Rape Crisis, Refuge, Women’s Aid Federation or the Survivors Trust. 
Following the consultation period it was confirmed that police officers are not included as third party 
assessors. The government state that the third-party evidence model will mean that neither 
Department for Work and Pensions or Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs staff will need to directly 
question claimants or take evidence from them. Decision makers are instructed to accept evidence 
from the approved third-party on the basis that the claimant had demonstrated that there 
circumstances are consistent with ‘those of a person whose child has been conceived as a result of 
non-consensual sex’.  
As part of an analysis of this issue it is important to examine both the official form that third parties 
need to complete and the DWP guidance that has been issued to accompany the form. This reveals 
not only important technical detail in relation to the responsibilities placed on third parties, but also 
says much about the ethics and philosophy that underpin this exception. The guidance states that 
professionals should only complete the exception form in the ‘course of your professional duties’. 
This seemingly simple statement is open to a wide range of interpretations about what constitutes 
‘professional duties’. This will be an issue that organisations and professionals will need to clarify 
and to be mindful of their relationship with service users. The guidance states that there is no 
requirement to seek evidence to confirm a claimant’s circumstances and that the third party is only 
confirming an understanding that what has been reported to them (the form asks only that the third 
party ticks a box to support the exception). Clearly the ambiguity of this statement is intended to 
prevent the need for a claimant to report and provide evidence in a way that would be required, for 
example, in a criminal setting. However, this gives a level of discretion and responsibility to a third 
party that they might not feel comfortable with and which again provides a potential area of conflict 
with a service user.   
There are multiple tensions within the third-party model: the specialist professionals with the 
greatest level of understanding of the needs of women who have been raped will perhaps be the 
least inclined to disclose information to the DWP/HMRC. Other professionals who are categorised as 
approved third parties may not have the knowledge and skills to appropriately understand the 
complex needs of this client group. There is a risk that professionals will make judgements about 
how a rape victim presents and behaves and consciously or unconsciously profile their service users 
accordingly. Some campaigning groups (CPAG, Citizens Advice Scotland) have argued that the list of 
third-party professionals should be extended to include advice workers and even family and friends 
or religious leaders. The rationale for this is that if the DWP and HMRC are prepared to accept 
reasonable evidence it should be allowed to come from the people who are the closest and most 
trusted by the claimant.  
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The rape exception has also raised concerns in relation to privacy and confidentiality. In a letter to 
the Employment Minister Damian Hinds the Social Security Advisory Committee (SSAC 2017) stated 
that given the limited number of situations in which this exception applies it would be 
straightforward to identify which of these applied to a particular claimant. The Minister considered 
that privacy could not be guaranteed but asserted that the DWP are experienced in dealing with 
sensitive data (Hinds 2017). CPAG (2016) have identified an extensive range of situations in which an 
‘accidental disclosure’ could be made. These include where there are joint claims for tax credits or 
universal credit with a current or future partner or where there are older children who are assisting 
with household finances.  Typically a tax credits or universal credit recipient will be claiming a range 
of other benefits and may need to seek advice about debt issues, student finance or discretionary 
grants. In each of these situations it may become apparent that the rape exception is being applied 
(Machin, 2017). 
The government maintains that women will not be forced to prove that they have been raped in 
order to secure welfare payments (HM Government 2017, p9). ‘The Government does recognise that 
the handling of this exception is very sensitive. As we introduce the measure we will set up 
procedures that are mindful of the sensitivities involved. Neither DWP nor HMRC staff will question 
the claimant about the incident other than to take the claim and receive the supporting evidence 
from the third party professional.’ 
Implications for anti-oppressive practice  
There is an overt political dimension to any discussion of anti-oppressive practice in relation to the 
two-child limit for means tested benefits. Thompson (2006) described the challenges associated with 
emancipatory practice when a ‘New Right’ philosophy focusing on the retrenchment of welfare 
provision dominates.  The acceleration of this philosophy since 2010 has resulted in many 
professionals working within the health and social care sector being forced to contemplate how they 
can appropriately support service users in a climate of cuts and austerity which run counter to their 
own professional values. The underlying challenge, therefore, for practitioners is to keep anti-
oppressive values at the core of practice when working within a system that many would view as 
promoting inequality and structural oppression. Banks and Gallagher (2009) consider individual and 
social justice to be linked and again this poses challenges for anti-oppressive practice when 
outcomes for individuals are interwoven with a programme of welfare reform characterised by 
judgment and conditionality. These tensions created by the welfare state in a capitalist society are of 
course nothing new (see for example the writing of Marshall 1972 and O’Connor 1973) but we are 
witnessing an unprecedented period of change. 
The language and terminology used to both describe benefit claimants and to justify welfare reform 
has been the subject of considerable academic debate. Garthwaite (2011) has drawn parallels 
between the contemporary use of phrases such as ‘shirkers’ and ‘strivers’ and historical depictions 
of the deserving and undeserving poor. Roulstone (2015) describes the way in which government 
policy is legitimised by the portrayal of vulnerable groups in the mass media. This means that we see 
government policy driven by popular media narrative rather than by a critical examination of social 
and economic need. It is clear that language plays a key role in anti-oppressive practice.  Dalrymple 
and Burke (2006, p150) have emphasised the importance of language in the connections and 
relationships that we build. Furthermore, they highlight the impact of language on professional 
relationships ‘the language that we use to describe the people with whom we are working 
characterizes the nature of the relationship and, in turn, how we will intervene in their lives’. 
Professionals supporting service users who are affected by benefit changes such as the two-child 
limit will need to be mindful that many claimants internalise the negative terms which are often 
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used to describe them, but can also use prejudicial language to describe others who are perceived to 
be in similar positions to themselves. The very fact that the exception described in the previous part 
of this paper is already referred to as the ‘rape clause’ demonstrates how value-laden language 
quickly becomes part of the professional lexicon. 
Ethical role modelling can play an important part in anti-oppressive practice. Leaders at all levels of 
an organisation (service directors, team leaders, senior case workers) are responsible for setting the 
ethical standards which they expect of staff and which then translate into the way in which services 
are delivered to clients (Millar and Poole 2011). Banks and Gallagher (2009) describe some of the key 
features of positive role modelling as avoiding favouritism and ensuring that the most marginalised 
and vulnerable are given a voice and fair access to services. This has implications for the way in 
which professionals work with those who are affected by the benefit changes introduced through 
welfare reform. An ethical approach must be underpinned by a recognition of the systematic 
oppression and inequality often experienced by benefit claimants and a genuine desire to improve 
their situation.  The two-child limit for means tested benefits has been identified as having a 
disproportionately negative impact on women from some ethnic backgrounds, refugee women, 
women who have larger families for religious reasons and families with disabled children. Positive 
role modelling will be of particular importance when working with these client groups. 
Dominelli (2010) emphasises that an understanding of inequality and oppression is central to anti-
oppressive practice. Whilst oppression operates on many levels practitioners need to demonstrate 
an ideological awareness to effectively support those affected by changes to benefit system such as 
the two-child limit. An overtly campaigning or critical stance may sit uncomfortably with some 
professionals, or indeed be incompatible with their role. However, an understanding of the impact 
of political decisions on the lives of service users is important. This paper has discussed some of the 
sensitive issues around confidentiality and privacy that the two-child policy raises and concerns have 
been raised about protecting claimant’s anonymity should they wish to challenge a decision to a 
social security appeal tribunal. Practitioners employed by public sector bodies will also be mindful to 
comply with the public sector equality duty which requires organisations to advance equality of 
opportunity and foster good relations between those who share a protected characteristic under the 
Equality Act 2010 (including pregnancy and maternity) and those who do not. 
 
Conclusion  
The full impact of the two-child policy will not be felt until the end of the current parliament. By 
2020/21 it is estimated that 640,000 families will be affected with families losing up to £2,780 per 
year for each additional child in the family. Many claimants affected by the two-child policy will also 
be affected by reductions to other benefits. Practitioners in the health and social care sector will 
need to provide support to help claimants cope with the cumulative impact of these measures. The 
two-child policy raises fundamental questions about the role of the welfare state, the move away 
from a needs based system and the extent to which political decisions can and should influence 
public behaviour. 
For practitioners the two-child policy raises a number of ethical dilemmas, not least the challenge of 
providing support to service users who are subject to a policy which may conflict with established 
professional values.  Significant concerns and questions persist about the third party evidence model 
and the new, perhaps unwanted, responsibilities this places on professionals to confirm 
circumstances of the most sensitive and private nature to benefit authorities. These dilemmas will 
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almost certainly follow the principle established by Handy in that they can be managed but not 
solved. (Handy 1994). 
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